A rational choice theory of 'Certiorari' : hierarchy, strategy and decision costs at the courts / 91-0110 by Spiller, Pablo T.


Faculty Working Paper 91-0110
Political Economy Series #44
330
B385
1991 lib
STX
COPY 2
A Rational Choice Theory of Certiorari:
Hierarchy, Strategy and Decision Costs at the Courts
Pablo T. SpiUer
Department of Economics
Institute of Government and Public Affairs
The Library o? the
APR I 199)
University of Illinois
of Uraana-Chapic-aign
Bureau of Economic and Business Research
College of Commerce and Business Administration
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
No. 1
No. 2
No. 3
NO. 4
NO. 5
No. 6
No. 7
No. 8
No. 9
No. 10
NO. 11
No. 12
NO. 13
No. 14
Papers in the Political Economy of Institutions Series
Susan I. Cohen. "Pareto Cptimality and Bidding for Contracts" Working Paper 1411
Jan K. Brueckner and Kar.goh Lee. "Spatially-Limited Altruism, Mixed Clubs, and Local Income Redistribution" Working
Paper #1406
George E. Monahan and vijay K. Vemuri. "Monotonicity cf Second-Best Optimal Contracts" Working Paper #1417
Charles D. Kolstad, Gary V. Johnson, and Thomas S. Ulen. "Ex Post Liability for Harm vs. Ex Ante Safety Regulation:
Substitutes or Complements?" Working Paper #1419
Lanny Arvan and Hadi S. Esfahani. "A Model of Efficiency Wages as a Signal of Firm Value" Working Paper #1424
Kalyan Chatterjee and Larry Samuelson. "Perfect Equilibria in Simultaneous-Offers Bargaining" Working Paper #1425
Jan K. Brueckner and Kangoh Lee. "Economies of Scope and Multiproduct Clubs" Working Paper #1428
Pablo T. Spiller. "Politicians, Interest Groups, and Regulators: A Multiple-Principals Agency Theory of Regulation
(or "Let Them Be Bribed" Working Paper #1436
Bhaskar Chakravorti. "Asymmetric Information, 'Interim' Equilibrium and Mechanism Design" Working Paper #1437
Bhaskar Chakravorti. "Mechanisms with No Regret: Welfare Economics and Information Reconsidered" working Paper #1438
Bhaskar Chakravorti. "Communication Requirements and Strategic Mechanisms- for Market Organization" Working Paper
1439
Susan I. Cohen and Martin Loeb. "On the Optimality of Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Joint Costs" Working
Paper #1445
Susan I. Cohen and Martin Loeb. "The Demand for Cost Allocations: The Case of Incentive Contracts Versus Fixed-Price
Contracts" Working Paper #1455
Jan K. Brueckner and Kevin M. O'Brien.. "Modeling Government Behavior in Collective Bargaining: A Test for Self-
interested Bureaucrats" Working Paper #1481
No. 15 Jan K. Brueckner. "Estimating a Bargaining Contract Curve: Prior Restrictions and Methodoiooy" Wonting PaDer
#1490
No. 16 Peter C. Reiss and Pablo T. Spiller. "Competiton and Entry in Small Airline Markets" Working Paper #1497
No. 17 Pablo T. Spiller. "A Note on Pricing of Hub-and-Spoke Networks" Working Paper #1498
No. 18 Larry DeBrock. "Joint Marketing Efforts and Pricing Behavior" Working Paper #1500
No. 19 Frank A. Wolak and Charles D. Kolstad. "A Model of Homogenous Input Demand Under Price Uncertainty" Workino Paper
#1502
No. 20 Susan I. Cohen. "Reputation, Intertemporal Incentives and Contracting" Working Paper #1511
No. 21 Lanny Arvan and Antonio Leite. "A Sequential Equilibrium Model of Cost Overruns in Long Term Projects" Working
paper #1514
No. 22 Jan K. Brueckner and Pablo T. Spiller. "Competiton and Mergers in Airline Networks" Working Paper #1523
No. 23 Hadi S. Esfahani. "Reputation, Product Quality, and Production Technology in LDC Markets" Working Paper #89-1525
No. 24 Hadi S. Esfahani. "Moral Hazard, Limited Entry Costs, and 'Introductory Offers'" Working Paper #89-1526
No. 25 Bhaskar Chakravorti. "Mechanisms with No Regret: Welfare Economics and Information Reconsidered" Working Paper
#89-1527
No. 26 Susan I. Cohen. "Implicit Cost Allocation and 3idding for Contracts" Working Paper #89-1558
No. 27 Rafael Gely and Pablo T. Spiller. "A Rational Choice Theory of the Supreme Court" Working Paper #89-1559
No. 28 Rafael Gely and Pablo T. Spiller. "An Economic Theory of Supreme Court Statutory Decisions The State Farm and Grove
City Cases" Working Paper #89-1560
No. 29 Rafael Gely and Pablo T. Spiller. "The Political Economy of Supreme Co'urt Constitutional Decisions: The Case of
Roosevelt's Court Packing Plan" Working Paper #89-1561
No. 30 Hadi S. Esfahani. "Reputation and Product Quality Revisited." Working Paper #89-1584
No. 31 Jan K. Brueckner. "Growth Controls and Land Values in an Open City." Working Paper #89-1594
No. 32 Jan K. Brueckner. "Tastes, Skills, and Local Public Goods." Working Paper #89-1610
No. 33 Luis Cabral and Shane Greenstein. "Switching Costs and Bidding Parity in Government Procurement of Computer
Systems." Working Paper #90-1628
No. 34 Charles D. Kolstad. "Hotelling Rents in Hotelling Space: Exhaustible Resource Rents with Product Differentiation."
Working Paper #90-1629
No. 35 Santiago Urbiztondo. "Investment without Regulatory Commitment: The Case of Elastic Demand." Working Paper #90-
1634
No. 36 Bhaskar Chakravorti. "Sequential Rationality, Implementation and Communication in Games." Working Paper #90-1636
No. 37 Pablo T. Spiller, Rafael Gely. "Congressional Control of Judicial Independence: The Determinants of US Supreme
Court Labor Relations Decisions, 1949/1987." Working Paper #90-1637
No. 38 Hans Brems. "Dynamic Macroeconomics: Fiscal and Monetary Policy." Working Paper #90-1640
No. 39 Lanny Arvan. "Flexibility Versus Commitment in Strategic Trade Policy Under Uncertainty: A Model of Endogenous
Policy Leadership." Working Paper #90-1651
No. 40 David T. Scheffman, Pablo T. Spiller. "Buyers' Strategies, Entry Barriers, and Competiton." Working Paper #90-1674
No. 41 Richard Arnould and Larry DeBrock. "Utilization Control in HMOs." Working Paper #90-1698
No. 42 ' Shane Greenstein. "Did Installed Base Give an Incumbent Any (Measurable) Advantages in Federal Computer
Procurement?" Working Paper #90-1718
No. 43 Bhaskar Chakravorti and Charles M. Kahn. "Universal Coalition-Proof Equilibrium" Working Paper #91-0100
BEBR
FACULTY WORKING PAPER NO. 91-0110
College of Commerce and Business Administration
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
February 1991
A Rational Choice Theory of Certiorari:
Hierarchy, Strategy and Decision Costs at the Courts
Pablo T. Spiller*
Department of Economics and
Institute of Government and Public Affairs
University of Illinois at Grbana-Champaign
I
*William B. McKinley Professor of Economics and Public Utilities, and Professor of Government and
Public Affairs, University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign. This paper was started as a comment on
Professor Lewis Kornhauser's presentation at the Stanford/Berkeley Conference on Constitutional Law
and Economics. I am grateful to the organizers of the conference for providing the intellectual impetus
for the writing of this paper, and to Ed Schwartz for many discussions on this topic. This research was
partially funded by NSF grant #SES-9008140.
Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2011 with funding from
University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
http://www.archive.org/details/rationalchoiceth110spil
January 20, 1991
A RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY OF CERTIORARI:
HIERARCHY, STRATEGY AND DECISION COSTS AT THE COURTS
by
Pablo T. Spiller
Department of Economics and
Institute of Government and Public Affairs
University of Illinois, at Urbana-Champaign
Abstract: This paper develops a rational choice model of Certiorari. The paper has two
building blocks: first, that the Court does not make (either Certiorari or substantive)
decisions in isolation. Instead, all Court's decisions are taken in a game with the other
institutions of government (i.e. Congress, administrative agencies, the President, and the
lower courts). Thus, modeling of this game is crucial to understand how Certiorari decisions
are taken. Second, Certiorari would play no role if the making of decisions was costless.
While there is substantial anecdotal evidence that such is the case, the important role of
decision costs have not yet been introduced in the formal modeling of Court behavior. We
show that decision costs provide discretion to the Appeal Courts. The extent of Appeal
Courts' discretion depends on the magnitude of decision costs and on the disutility the
Court gets from outcomes distant from its ideal point. Furthermore, decision costs at the
Court imply that the Supreme Court is more responsive than lower courts to marginal
changes in the composition of Congress. Finally, we show that in equilibrium, Cert is
granted only if decision costs are stochastic.
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Conference on Constitutional Law and Economics. I am grateful to the organizers of the
conference for providing the intellectual impetus for the writing of this paper, and to Ed
Schwartz for many discussions on this topic. This research was partially funded by a NSF
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I. Introduction
The Supreme Court among all Courts in the US judiciary is the only one that can
actually decide which cases to consider. This feature of the Court tends to bias most studies
of Supreme Court decisions. 1 There has been substantial political and legal research trying
to understand the Certiorari decision and how it relates to the final decisions on the cases
themselves. 2 This literature, however, has focused almost exclusively on justices' voting
strategies without considering further the interaction between the Supreme Court and the
other institutions of government. 3 A separate, but related, literature has focused on the
extent by which lower courts follow changes in Supreme Court policies. 4 This literature,
however, has not modeled the relationship between lower court responsiveness and the
extent of Supreme Court decision costs and its interaction with other institutions of
government, and hence, with the Certiorari process.
In this paper we develop a rational choice model of Certiorari decisions which is
based on an analysis of the interaction among the Supreme Court, the lower courts and
Congress along the lines of Gely and Spiller (1990a, 1990b), Spiller and Gely (1990), and
(1991). This research is related to a series of recent work that model the judiciary as it
interacts with the other institutions of Congress. In particular, it is closely related to the
work by Ferejohn and Shipan (1990), Marks (1988), and McCubbins, Noll and Weingast
(1987), (1989). The model has two main building blocks: first, the Court does not make
1 In Spiller and Gely (1991) there is a discussion of how it affects their econometric
estimates of the determinants of Supreme Court preferences, and how they have tried to
deal with that bias.
2 See Schubert (1959) for one of the first quantitative studies of the Certiorari process.
For more recent empirical analyses see Brenner and Krol (1989), Palmer (1982), Songer
(1979), Teger and Kosinski (1980), and Ulmer (1984).
3 See, however, Caldeira and Wright (1988), who consider the role of organized interest
groups in the Certiorari process.
4 Sec, for example, Gruhl (1980), Songer (1987) and Songer and Shcehan (1990) and
references therein.
(either Certiorari or substantive) decisions in isolation. Instead, all Court's decisions are
taken in a game with the other institutions of government (i.e. Congress, administrative
agencies, the President, and the appeal courts). Thus, the modeling of this game is crucial to
understand how Certiorari decisions are taken. Second, Certiorari would play no role if the
making of decisions was not an expensive activity. While there is substantial anecdotal
evidence that such is the case, the crucial role of decision costs have not yet been
introduced in the formal modeling of Court behavior.
II. The Model
We develop here a simple model of Supreme Court-Appeal Court-Congress
interaction which is based on Gely and Spiller (1990a) and in particular on the single
dimensional model of Spiller and Gely (1991). The reader is referred to those papers for
further elaboration of the basic framework. 5 The analysis in this section focuses on
statutory rather than Constitutional issues. A discussion of Constitutional issues is given in
Gely and Spiller (1990b). We leave for future research the analysis of the Certiorari process
for Constitutional issues.
The Basic Assumptions
The analysis is based on several simplifying assumptions concerning the four players:
the House, the Senate, the Appeal Court and the Supreme Court.
The first set of assumptions concerns Congressional preferences. It is assumed that
Congress is a bicameral legislature, with both houses having well defined, single peaked and
5 For expositional reasons the President and administrative agencies are left outside the
framework, but, as Gely and Spiller (1990a) show, given the assumptions about individual
preferences and strategies, their introduction would not change qualitatively the results.
See, however, Spiller (1990b) for a framework where agencies and Presidential executive
power play important roles.
stable preferences over a single dimensional policy space represented by the real line. The
modern theory of Congressional institutions (e.g. Weingast and Marshall (1988), Shepsle and
Weingast (1987, 1989)) suggests that committees have substantial power over the issues under
their jurisdiction. In particular, because of their gate-keeping and veto power (i.e. they may
block legislation from being introduced, as well as kill or modify legislation in conference),
committee members' preferences may dominate issue specific legislation. Thus, the
assumption about legislators' preferences is equivalent to assume full control of legislature
outcomes by the relevant committees.6 Seen in this light, these assumptions may not
drastically violate reality. 7
The second set of assumptions concerns the preferences of the Supreme Court. The
Court is assumed to have well defined, single peaked and stable preferences over the policy
space. The source of the Court's preferences, however, are different from those of the
legislators. While legislators "vote their district,"8 Supreme Court justices are not subject to
reelection. We assume, then, that the Court's preferences are essentially ideologically
based. 9 The assumption about the Court's preferences is similar to assume that the Court is
a single individual. This is a strong assumption. Since the framework of analysis in this
proposal is single dimensional, however, it essentially implies that the median voter in the
6 For extension of this framework to alternative models of congressional decision
making, see Spiller (1990a).
7 See, however, Gilligan and Krehbiel (1988) for a different view of committees
composition.
8 See Fiorina (1974), Kalt and Zupan (1984), Kau and Rubin (1979), and Peltzman
(1984), for empirical tests of this proposition.
9 While the justices' monetary well-being may be unrelated to the issue in question, it is
nevertheless reasonable to assume that they may have strong views about the substance of
the case. Furthermore, political considerations form part of the appointment process,
making it important to consider the political preferences of the justices. Thus, it is
reasonable to assume that Supreme Court justices have stable preferences over the policy
space.
Court is the decisive individual. 10 We furthermore assume that the Court is free to make
its decisions on a continuum, rather than just on a yes or no basis. 11 Finally, the
preferences of the Appeal Court are, as those of the Supreme Court, well behaved, and
single-peaked on the single-dimensional policy space, R.
Each player, then, has an ideal point in R. We call H, S, AC and SC the ideal points
of the House, the Senate, the Appeal Court and the Supreme Court respectively.
The third set of assumptions relates to the nature of Supreme Court decision costs.
We assume that considering and making a decision on a case implies a cost equal to T. To
simplify the analysis we first assume that T is deterministic. Below we relax this
assumption and explore the implications of stochastic decision costs. If the Court, then,
makes a decision in the real line such that the outcome is E, and E is valued by the Supreme
Court as U 8C(E), then the net gain from making the decision E is U SC(E)-T. 12
The Game
10 This assumption, implies, however, that Cert decisions are taken by the median voter,
which may not be right as four justices are enough to force the Court to consider a decision.
Furthermore, if the policy space was multi-dimensional, then the median voter theorem may
not readily be applied. For a discussion of this issue as it applies to analyses of the Court
see Easterbrook (1982). Spiller and Gely (1990), however, provide conditions under which
the median voter result can be applied to a multidimension bargaining game between the
Court and Congress.
11 There are several reasons why this assumption may be proper. First, the Court is free
to interpret in its own way each case that comes to it. Second, the decision to grant cert
allows the Court to choose that case that fits its preferred outcome. Finally, it can use dicta
to call for a particular type of case. Note, however, that as shown in Spiller (1990b), would
the Court constraint itself to decide cases on a yes or no bases, then the equilibrium will
change.
12
It is clear that not only the Supreme Court incurs costs in making decisions, but also
the lower courts and Congress as well. Decision costs for the lower courts are, to a large
extent, irrelevant, as they cannot choose not to not to consider a case. Congressional
decision costs^ however, are quite important and real, and as the analysis of decision costs at
the Supreme Court level shows, it would increase the discretion of the Supreme Court. Its
treatment is left for future research, as introducing transaction costs at the legislative level
would make the model substantially more complicated.
The focus is on policy-making. Policy can be made by a specific legislative act, by
the actions of an administrative agency 13 , or by a judicial decision. The role of the
Appeal Court is to review administrative agencies' decisions, while that of the Supreme
Court is to review the decisions of the Appeal Court. The judicial decisions define the
policy that would take effect unless they are reversed by a joint action of the House and the
Senate.
In the absence of a judicial system, and for that matter of a President and/or
administrative agencies, the House and the Senate will bargain over the issue, and an
outcome (weakly) in between the ideal points of the two chambers should arise as an
equilibrium. 14 That is, bargaining between the House and the Senate will bring about a
legislative outcome, X L , in the contract set between the House and the Senate.
15
There are many ways of modeling the interaction between Congress and the Courts.
We propose a simple bargaining framework consisting of four stages. In the first stage an
agency makes a statutory interpretation. 16 In the second stage, the Court of Appeals
makes a determination. In the third stage the Supreme Court decides whether to grant
Cert. If Cert is granted, then the Court makes a policy determination. This policy then
becomes the status quo for the bargaining game between the two houses of Congress that
13 As mentioned above, we assume away the role of the President. In a one dimensional
policy space, introducing the President implies that reversing a Supreme Court decision
requires the approval of the President as well. As discussed at length in the attached paper,
the assumption does not qualitatively change the nature of the results.
14 The actual bargaining game played between the House and the Senate is irrelevant.
All what is assumed is that the outcome will be Pareto efficient, and that the bargaining
process cannot make any player worse off as compared to the status quo.
15 Depending on the nature of the bargaining game being played, there may or not exist
a deterministic function relating the bargaining outcome to the ideal points of the two
chambers and to the initial status quo.
16
If the case did not start with an administrative agency, then that decision can be seen
as taken by a Federal or State District Court.
takes place in the fourth stage of the game. If Cert is not granted, however, the Appeal
Court decision becomes the status quo in the fourth stage.
Bargaining between the two houses of Congress for an alternative policy outcome
occurs then at the fourth and final stage of the game. 17 The outcome of the final stage is
the final policy outcome. If the House and the Senate agree on an alternative policy to that
of the judiciary (whether that of the Supreme Court if Cert was granted or alternatively
that of the Appeal Court if Cert was denied), then the Congressional decision becomes the
law. If, instead, Congress cannot agree on an alternative policy, then the judicial decision
becomes the law.
Solving the Game
To solve this game subgame perfection is assumed throughout. Subgame perfection
allows us to solve the game backwards, as at each node of the game each player, before
making a move, solves the game as it will evolve following its decision. It can then be seen
that the equilibrium to this game has to be in the contract set between the House and the
Senate (i.e., in between their ideal points). To see this consider a judicial decision that falls
outside the contract set between the House and the Senate. Efficient congressional
bargaining, then, implies that an outcome inside the contract set will be achieved. That is,
the judicial decision will be reversed. If, however, the judicial decision falls inside the
contract set, then, the judicial decision becomes the law.
Consider now the Supreme Court policy decision given that it has decided to grant
Cert. Since the Court anticipates the bargaining outcome arising from any feasible decision,
it will make its decision strategically, such that it will maximize its utility and not being
17 The judiciary's choice of the status quo serves, then, as the initial bargaining point
for the two houses of Congress. Observe, that since the bargaining outcome is both efficient m
and cannot make any of the houses of Congress worse off than the status quo, then the
judicial decision sets limits to the set of feasible bargaining outcomes.
reversed. In other words, the Court will pick that point in the contract set between the
House and the Senate that maximizes its own utility. Would the Supreme Court's decision
be outside the contract set between the House and the Senate, it would trigger a legislative
bargaining process, with its outcome almost surely being strictly inside the contract set. 18
Thus, if the ideal point of the Court is outside the contract set, its optimal decision point is
the closest boundary of the contract set. On the other hand, if the Court's ideal point is
inside the contract set, then its optimal decision is its own ideal point.
There are, then, three possible equilibrium outcomes given that Cert has been
granted (see Figure 1). First, if the ideal point of the Court, SC, is to the right of the
contract set (represented in Figure 1 by the interval [H,S]) then the equilibrium is the upper
bound of the contract set (S, in Figure 1). Second, if SC is to the left of the contract set,
then the equilibrium is its lower bound (H, in Figure 1). Third, if SC is inside the contract
set, then the equilibrium is given by SC.
Those three possibilities represent all the equilibria that can develop following the
granting of Cert. The Court, then, when granting Cert will consider those outcomes as
against the outcomes that could evolve if Cert would be denied. To solve the Court's Cert
problem, consider a given Appeal Court decision, call it A. If Cert is not granted, then call
G(A) the outcome of the congressional bargaining at the fourth stage of the game. G(A)
must, by construction, belong to the contract set [H,S]. As mentioned above, then, the
decision to grant Cert depends on whether or not U SC(E) < U 8C(G(A))+T.
18 To see this, consider a Court's decision outside the contract set. Call that point
y=S+x, assume x>0 and S>H. Assuming symmetric utility functions, the outcome to the
bargaining game between the House and the Senate has to be in the set
[Max(S-x,H),S]. For exposition assume S-x>H. That the outcome cannot be to the left of S-x
arises from the symmetry of the Senate's preferences and from the fact that the bargaining
cannot make the Senate worse off than the status quo, y=S+x. That it cannot be more than S
arises from the efficiency of the bargaining process. While S is a feasible solution to the
bargaining, observe, however, that the Senate's initial offer would most certainly be S,
while the House's initial offer would most certainly be S-x. Thus, it is reasonable to expect
the bargaining outcome to be less than S.
There are, again, three possible regimes. Regime 1, when SC > Max(H,S); Regime 2
when SC < Min(H,S); and Regime 3 when Min(H,S) < SC < Max(H,S).
Consider, first, the equilibria that can develop in Regime 1. Let, M*, M*<SC, be such
that U8C(Max(H,S))=U8C(M*)+T. That is, if M* is the equilibrium without granting Cert, then
the Supreme Court is indifferent between granting Cert and making the decision equal to
Max(H,S), or not granting Cert and the outcome M* arising either because the Appeal Court
decided M*=L^H,S], or because M*=G(A) when the Appeal Court decision A was not in
[H,S]. 19 See Figure 2a. Thus, in Regime 1, the Court will grant Cert only when G(A) < M*,
that is, only in those cases that if Cert is not granted the equilibrium will be "too far" away
from the best the Court can do, Max(H,S), where "too far" depends on the level of decision
costs and on the Court's disutility from decisions far away from its ideal point (i.e. the
shape of the utility function). If G(A) > M*, then the Court will not grant Cert.
Consider, now, equilibria in Regime 2. Define N*, N*>SC, similarly, as such that
U8C(Min(H,S))=U8C(N*)+T. 20 See Figure 2a. Thus, again, were G(A) be to the right of N*
the Court will grant Cert and make the decision equal to Min(H,S).
Consider, finally, equilibria in Regime 3. Now, the area in which the Court will not
grant Cert surrounds its ideal point. If absent Cert the equilibria will be "too far away" of
its ideal point SC, the Court will intervene and make the outcome its own ideal point. Call,
then, SC* and *SC the upper and lower bounds of the non-Cert region. SC* and *SC are
given by the two solutions to U 8C(SC)=U8C(x)+T, where SC*>SC>*SC, 21 see Figure 2b. Thus,
19
It is feasible that the solution to U 8C(Max(H,S))=U 8C(x)+T, x*<SC, implies that
x*<Min(H,S). In that case define M*=Min(H,S), because, from the previous discussion, no
equilibria can be outside the segment [Min(H,S),Max(H,S)].
20 Again, would the solution to U8C(Min(H,S))=U 8C(x)+T imply x*>Max(H,S), then define
N*=Max(H,S).
21 Again, would the solutions to U 8C(Min(H,S))=U 8C(x)+T be outside [H,S], then define
SC*=Max(H,S) and *SC = Min(H,S).
8
if G(A) e [*SC,SC*], then G(A) becomes the equilibrium. If, however, G(A) <2 [*SC,SC*],
then the equilibrium is SC.
Finally, consider the strategic moves of the Appeal Court. Assume, first that SC <
Min(H,S). As discussed above all equilibria can only reside in the segment [Min(H,S),N*]. If
the Appeal Court would choose a point outside [Min(H,S),N*], then the Supreme Court
would reverse it and bring the outcome inside the segment [Min(H,S),N*]. Thus, there are
three feasible outcomes: First, if the Appeal Court's ideal point, AC, is to the left of
Min(H,S), then, it would make its decision, A, as Min(H,S), and thus G(A)=A=Min(H,S). If,
AC > N*, then A=N*=G(A), as Congress would not be able to reverse the Appeal Court
decision A=N*. Finally, if ACe[Min(H,S),N*], then A=AC, and again A=AC=G(A), as A
belongs to the contract set in Congress. Thus, the decision of the Appeal Court becomes the
equilibrium.
Similar analysis imply that if SC>Max(H,S) there are three feasible equilibria, E.
First, E=AC when ACe[M*,Max(H,S)]; E=Max(H,S) when AC>Max(H,S); and E=M* when
AC<M*. Finally, when SCe[Min(H,S),Max(H,S)], then the three feasible equilibria are
again: E=AC when ACe[*SC,SC*], E=*SC when AC<*SC and E=SC* when AC>SC*.
Stochastic Decision Costs
In this section we expand the model to allow for stochastic decision costs. In the
previous sections we showed that with perfect information and exogenously given decision
costs, the Supreme Court, in equilibrium, will not grant Cert to any case, as the Appeal
Court will strategically chose its decisions from the no-Cert set. When decision costs are
unknown to the Appeal Court, then Certiorari will be granted in those cases where decision
costs are lower than expected. The Appeal Court, however, will take the distribution of
decision costs into account in making its decision.
To show the workings of the model in this case, consider, for simplicity, a situation
where the ideal point of the Supreme Court, SC, is inside the congressional contract set.
Thus, if the Court grants Cert the outcome becomes SC. Assume, furthermore, that the ideal
point of the Appeal Court is to the right of the congressional contract set. Assume, now that
the preferences of the Appeal Court are given by UAC(x/AC) = -|x-AC|, and those of the
Supreme Court by Usc(x/SC)= -|x-SC|. Let furthermore T be given by T=T*+v, with F(i/)
(f(j/)) being i/'s cumulative distribution (density) function. 22 From the assumptions about
Supreme Court preferences, the upper limit to the no-Cert region, SC*, is given by SC* =
SC+T*+^ for values of u such that SC+T*+i/ < S, where it is assumed as in Figure 2a that S
> H. For those values of v such that SC+T*+i/ > S, SC* = S.
As discussed above, sugbame perfection rules out Appeal Court decisions, A, outside
the contract set [H,S]. We can then concentrate on Ae[H,S]. Thus, if A>SC* then the final
outcome is SC, and the utility of the Appeal Court is given by -(AC-SC). If, however, A <
SC*, then the Appeal Court's decision becomes the final outcome, and the utility level of the
Appeal Court is given by -(AC-A). The Appeal Court's tradeoff is as follows: It can make a
decision relatively close to its ideal point but have a relatively high probability of being
reversed (and hence of sustaining an outcome much distant from its ideal point), or
choosing a decision which while being further away from its ideal point, it has a higher
probability of not being reversed. It is straightforward to see, then, that the maximization
of the expected utility of the Appeal Court implies that the optimal decision A is given by
sc t
1-FJA--SC-T-) $c f l-F(A--SC-T-) t g
.. , fiA'-sc-r) ftA'-sc-ry
S if SC* 1-FVSC-T-) > s
M'-sc-r)
Observe that the distributional assumption may violate the fact that T>0. The
distribution of u should actually be truncated with a lower bound k>-T*.
10
The term F(x)/f(x) is the hazard ratio which is usually assumed, in the non-linear
pricing literature, to be non-decreasing in x. Thus, under that assumption we obtain that
the optimal value of A is non-decreasing in T* and SC. That is, increases in the ideal point
of the Supreme Court would (weakly) increase the optimal decision at the Appeal Court
level, as will increases in Supreme Court decision costs. Similar analysis can be used to
derive the equilibria for the other cases.
Comparative Statics
In this section we explore the extent by which the judiciary "reads election results"
(Gely and Spiller (1990)) for the case of deterministic decision costs. The extension for the
case of stochastic decision costs is straightforward. The main result that we want to show is
that the Supreme Court is more responsive than the Court of Appeals to changes in
Congressional preferences.
Whether the Supreme Court follows Congressional preferences depends on the
location of its ideal point. If the ideal point of the Supreme Court is inside the contract set
between the two houses of Congress (H,S), then, marginal changes in the composition of
Congress would not have any effect on the no-Cert region, as long as *SC and SC* are inside
the contract set. See Figure 2a. Thus, since the final equilibrium is in the set [*SC,SC*]
with the exact outcome depending on the exact location of the Appeal Court, neither the
Supreme Court nor the Courts of Appeal read election results. Consider, instead, the
situation where the ideal point of the Supreme Court is not inside the contract set between
the two houses of Congress (see Figure 2a), say that SC > Max(H,S). Then the final
equilibrium is in the set [M*,Max(H,S)J ([M*,S] in Figure 2a), with the exact outcome
depending on the location of the Appeal Court. If the ideal point of the Appeal Court is not
in [M*,Max(H,S)], then both the Supreme Court and the Appeal Courts read election results,
as, say, a marginal increase in Max(H,S) would bring also an increase in M*, and hence will
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trigger changes in both Supreme Court Cert and case decisions, and in Appeal Court
decisions as well. If, however, the ideal point of the Appeal Court is inside [M*,Max(H,S)],
then marginal changes in Max(H,S) will trigger changes in Supreme Court policies, but not
on those of the Appeal Court.
We have shown, then, that there are conditions under which the Supreme Court
would follow the changes in the composition of Congress, but the Appeal Courts would not.
Finally, it is straightforward to see that if the Appeal Courts follows changes in Congress so
will the Supreme Court. To see this, observe that for the optimal policy of the Appeal Court
to follow changes in the composition of Congress, the ideal point of the Appeal Court
cannot be inside the no-Cert region. Thus, it is changes in the no-Cert region that triggers
changes in the policies of the Appeal Court. But changes in the no-Cert region also changes
the optimal policies of the Supreme Court. Thus, we have shown that a) under certain
conditions the Supreme Court responds to changes in the composition of Congress but the
Appeal Courts do not, and b) there are no conditions under which the Appeal Courts
respond to changes in the composition of Congress but the Supreme Court does not. Thus,
the Appeal Courts are less responsive to the electorate than the Supreme Court.
A second comparative statics result concerns the extent by which lower courts follow
changes in the composition of the Supreme Court. From the previous discussion it is clear
that changes in the composition of the Supreme Court would only matter if they change the
no-Cert region. That is clearly the case in Regime 3, that is, where the ideal point of the
Supreme Court is inside the congressional contract set. When SC is outside the contract set,
though, the effect on the no-Cert set depends on the shape of the Usc function. If, for
example, Usc(x) = -|x-SC|, then, marginal changes in SC will not change the inside
boundary of the no-Cert region. 23
*
23 For example, let SC<Min(H,S), then, N*=H+T, which is independent of SC.
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III. Final Comments
This analysis has several implications that are consistent with anecdotal evidence
and some previous empirical analyses. First, observe that in the absence of forecast errors
by the Appeal Court concerning the ideal points of Congress and/or of the Supreme Court,
or on the magnitude of the Court's decision costs, the Supreme Court would never grant Cert
as all Appeal Court decisions would be in the no-Cert range. Thus, this framework implies
that the Court should grant Cert to only a small percentage of appealed cases per year. On
the other hand, very active periods should follow changes in the composition of the
Supreme Court or of Congress.
Second, even though Appeal Court judges may have very different ideological values
as those of the Supreme Court justices, the current model predicts that Appeal Court judges,
in general, would follow changes in Supreme Court views. 24 Furthermore, this model
suggests that Appeal Courts would also follow changes in the political composition of
Congress, even though to a lesser extent than the Supreme Court. Thus, not only the
Supreme Court reads election results (Gely and Spillcr (1990a)), but Appeal Courts as well.
However, since the effect of elections on Appeal Courts is through the Certiorari process,
the extent by which Appeal Courts follow changes in the electorate depends on the
magnitude of Supreme Court decision costs and on the degree of homogeneity of
preferences in both houses of Congress.
Appeal Courts matter, then, as preferences of Appeal Court judges impact upon the
final equilibrium. The extent of their discretion, however, depends on the magnitude of
Supreme Court decision costs, T, on the Supreme Court's disutility from outcomes different
24 Several scholars have analyzed the extent by which lower courts follow the views of
the Supreme Court. While some studies have found important lower court deviations from
Supreme Court policies (e.g. Beatty (1972)), they tend to focus on a narrow period and on a
narrow set of issues (e.g. civil liberties). Other studies, however, seem to have found support
to the hypothesis that lower courts tend to follow Supreme Court policies, (e.g. Gruhl (1980),
Songer (1987), and Songer and Sheehan (1990)).
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from its ideal point, and on the extent of heterogeneity in Congress. The extent of
discretion of the Supreme Court depends, on the other hand, only on the degree of
heterogeneity in Congress. If both houses of Congress have similar preferences, then there
is no discretion left neither to the Supreme nor to the Appeal Courts.
While simple, then, this simple model seems to capture important features of the
Certiorari process. The model, however, can be extended in several dimensions. First, while
uncertainty was introduced at the level of decision costs, it can also be introduced at the
level of the political preferences of the Court. Introducing uncertainty over preferences
will allow us to develop not only a more realistic theory of the Cert process, but also we may
start dealing with the concept of Precedent as well. This, however, is left for future
research.
A second important extension is to consider individual justices votes, as in Spiller
(1990b) and (1990c). The main advantage of dealing with individual justices rather than
with a single justice court is that it will allow us to better understand the strategic
implications of the four members' rule for consideration of cases.
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FIGURE 1
Equilibria Following Cert in a
Single Dimensional Policy Space
Regime 2 i Regime 3
,
Regime 1
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H = Ideal Point of the House
S = Ideal Point of the Senate
SC =• Ideal Point of the Supreme Court
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FIGURE 2A
Determination of the Cert
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FIGURE 2B
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